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Abstract   
 
This research aimed to get empirical evidence in detecting financial statement fraud with fraud perspective 
diamond. Research by Sihombing (2014) explained that diamond fraud is an outlook and new concepts about the 
phenomenon of fraud raised by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004). Proxy variables of this research using pressure that 
is proxied by financial stability, external pressure, and financial targets; opportunity is proxied by ineffective 
monitoring and nature of the industry; rationalization is proxied by the turn of the auditor and capability is proxied 
by the change of directors. This research examined the empirical evidence to detect financial statement fraud with 
fraud perspective diamond. This study refers to the banking company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 
results of this research indicate that the variable pressure is proxied by financial stability, external pressure, and 
financial targets; Opportunity is proxied by ineffective monitoring and nature of the industry; Rationalization is 
proxied by the turn of the auditor and Capability proxied by the change of directors. But in this research proves 
that the Variable Pressure with proxies financial stability, external pressure and financial targets; Opportunity 
Variable, Nature of the Industry, Ineffective Monitoring and Rationalization variables change in the Auditor does 
not affect the financial statement fraud while Capability variable with proxy turn of directors gave a positive and 
significant effect on the Financial Statement Fraud. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial statement fraud is a matter of social and economic concerns that are attacking this country. This led to 
a decline in market value and directs affect the company in bankruptcy and could harm the state and increasing 
attention on the act of fraud financial statements. Several cases of fraud in the financial statements of the 
accounting scandals could damage the image and confidence of investors to re-invest in the financial markets. 
 
The increasing cases of fraud in the financial statements in the world led to various parties speculate that the 
management has done a fraud on financial statements (Skousen et al, 2009). This research was conducted by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE, 2014) found that the perpetrators of fraud based on the level of 
authority, 42% is done by employees, 36% level managers and about 19% done by the owner of the company 
itself, the results of this study are consistent from year to year, while the fraud in the banking and finance in the 
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world there are 244 (37.3%) cases of fraud (http://www.acfe.com/rttn.aspx). If the financial statement fraud is 
indeed a very significant problem, as responsible auditor must be able to detect any fraudulent activity before it 
eventually evolved into an accounting scandal that is very detrimental for companies and investors. 
 
This research aimed to detect the financial statement fraud using fraud diamond analysis as the research that has 
been done by Sihombing (2014) explained that diamond fraud is an outlook and new concepts about the 
phenomenon of fraud raised by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004). If in the fraud triangle there are three elements, 
then in the diamond fraud there is a significant element influencing someone to doing fraud, and that is the 
capability. Proxy variables of this study can be used, pressure that is proxied by financial stability, external 
pressure, and financial targets; and opportunity proxied by ineffective monitoring and nature of the industry; 
rationalization is proxied by the turn of the auditor and capability are proxied by the change of directors. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Theory of Agency 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) in Maudy (2013), using three assumptions of agency theory of human nature, 
namely: (1) humans is generally selfish (self interest), (2) humans have limited the power of thought about the 
perception of the future (bounded rationality) and (3) humans always avoid the risk (risk averse). The third trait 
causes of human-generated information to other human beings always questionable reliability and information 
submitted does not comply with generally accepted that the actual condition of the company, or better known as 
asymmetric information (Ujiyantho & Scouting, 2007). It gives the chance or opportunity to managers to manage 
earnings. 
 
2.2  The concept of Fraud 
 
Fraud is an act and the action taken deliberately, consciously know and want to abuse everything that belongs 
together, for example: resource companies and countries for personal enjoyment and then presenting 
misinformation to cover up such abuse. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Fraud Triangle 
 
The concept of the fraud triangle introduced in the professional literature on the SAS no. 99, Consideration of 
Fraud in a financial statement audit. Cressey (1953) in Skousen et al. (2009) concluded that fraud in general have 
three common characteristics. Fraud triangle composed of three conditions that are generally at the time the fraud 
occurred, i.e., incentive / pressure, opportunity and attitude / rationalization (Turner et al., 2003). 
 
2.3  Fraud Diamond 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Fraud Diamond Model 
 
 
  
Proceedings of the International Conference on Accounting Studies (ICAS) 2015 
17-20 August 2015, Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia 
 
  
281 
Fraud diamond is a new view of the phenomenon Fraud proposed by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004). Fraud 
diamond is a form of refinement of the theory of fraud triangle by Cressey (1953). Fraud diamond adds a 
qualitative element that is believed to have a significant influence to the Fraud Capability. Although the fraud 
triangle are present and are still used in the relevant translation of the factors that influence the occurrence of 
fraud, fraud is expected to add to the reference diamond investigators, practitioners and academics in the 
development of fraud cases. 
 
2.4  Earning Management 
 
Earnings management has been described differently by academics, researchers, practitioners and other authorized 
organizations (Rezaee, 2002). Schipper (1997) in Rezaee (2002) defines earnings management as an intervention 
against external financial reporting process to gain some personal advantage. Earnings management is often 
carried out on management intervention. The statement was in line with Healy and Wahlen (1999) which states 
that earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and manipulation of 
transactions to alter financial statements, either to mislead some stakeholders about the company's performance 
or to influence the contract that relies on figures in the financial statements. 
 
The concept of earnings management by Salno and Baridwan (2000: 19) using agency theory approach which 
states that the practice of earnings management is influenced by conflict of interest that arise because each party 
seeks to achieve or take into consideration the level of prosperity it wants. Conflicts of interest is increasing mainly 
because the principal can not monitor the activities of daily management to ensure that management works in 
accordance with the wishes of shareholders. 
 
2.5  Financial Statement Fraud 
 
Financial Statement Fraud is an intentional or omissions in the reporting of the financial statements in which the 
financial statements are not presented in accordance with generally acceptable accounting principles. This 
deliberate omission or material nature that may influence the decision to be taken by the parties concerned. 
 
Wells (2011), Financial Statement Fraud includes several modes, among others: 
1.  Forgery, alteration, or manipulation of financial records (financial records), supporting documents or 
business transactions. 
2.  Removal of deliberate on events, transactions, accounts, or other significant information as a source of 
financial statement presentation. 
3.  Application of false and deliberate on the accounting principles, policies, and procedures used to measure, 
recognize, report and disclose economic events and business transactions. 
4.  Removal of deliberate on the information that should be presented and disclosed regarding the principles 
and accounting policies used in the financial reporting (Rezaee, 2002). 
 
3.  MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
This study uses quantitative methods to analyse the independent variable which is a component of the fraud 
triangle with financial statement fraud with the dependent variable Pressure categorized into financial stability, 
external pressure, financial targets, Opportunity categorized into the Nature of Industry and ineffective 
monitoring, rationalization categorized into in Change in auditors and capability with 7 dependent variables. 
 
3.1  Hypothesis 
 
H1: Financial stability can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
H2: External Pressure can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
H3: Financial Targets can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
H4: Nature of Industry can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
H5: Ineffective monitoring can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
H6: Change in Auditor can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
H7: Capability can be used to detect financial statement fraud. 
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
4.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The Dependent Variable in this research is financial statement fraud which proxied by earning management, 
namely: Value Discretionary Accrual of Modified Jones Model (DACCit), while the Independent Variables, 
Pressure categorized into groups, Financial Stability is proxied by the ratio of the change in total assets 
(ACHANGE), External Pressure proxied by the ratio Leverage (LEV), Financial Targets proxied by Return on 
Assets (ROA), Opportunity grouped into the Nature of the Industry proxied by the ratio of Receivables Business 
(RECEIVABLE), Ineffective Monitoring of proxies with an Independent Commissioner (BDOUT), 
Rationalization grouped into Change in Auditor proxied by Substitution Public Accountant (△CPA) and 
Capability is proxied by the Board of Directors Change (DCHANGE). 
 
4.1  Population, Sample and Sampling Techniques 
 
The population in this study are all banking companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 
2012-2014. Considerations for selecting a population of manufacturing enterprises is due to the company in one 
type of company that banks tend to have characteristics similar accrual (Halim et al., 2005). In addition, the 
banking company's financial reporting data is more reliable in the presentation of the accounts of the financial 
statements, such as assets, cash flow, sales, and others. 
 
The sampling technique was done by purposive sampling in order to obtain a representative sample in accordance 
with prescribed criteria. The criteria used to select the sample are as follows: 
1.  Companies that go public banks or listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) during the period 2012-
2014. 
2.  The Company publishes annual financial statements and independent audit reports on the website 
www.idx.com on Indonesia Stock Exchange 
3.  Detailed data available relating to the variables in the banking company (overall data available on the 
publication during the period 2012-2014). 
 
4.2  Analysis Method 
 
The relationship between discretionary accruals and proxies of fraud triangle was tested using a model according 
to research Skousen et al. (2009) in Sihombing (2014). Hypothesis testing is done by multiple regression, namely: 
 
DACCit = ß0 + ß1ACHANGE + ß2LEV + ß3ROA + ß4RECEIVABLE + ß5BDOUT + ß6∆CPA + ß7∆DCHANGE 
+ εi 
Specification: 
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ß0 = coefficient of regression constants 
ß1,2,3,4,5,6,7  = regression coefficient of each proxy 
DACCit   = discretionary accruals firm i year t 
ACHANGE  = percentage change in the total assets of the year 2012-2014 
LEV  = Ratio of total liabilities per total assets 
Receivable  = accounts receivable ratio changes 
BDOUT  = ratio of independent directors 
ΔCPA  = Change of Independent Auditor 
DCHANGE  = Change of Directors 
ε  = error 
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Description of Research Samples 
 
Here's a table of descriptive statistical analysis that provides an overview of the data that is visible from a minimum 
value, maximum, average, and standard deviation of the variables tested. 
 
5.2  Description of Research Samples 
 
Descriptive Data aims to provide an overview of research data characteristics. The table below contains the 
descriptive data from the dependent variable Financial Statement Fraud and 7 (seven) independent variables used 
in this research 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Statistic 
Financial_Stability 11 .75 -.05 .70 .2045 .07021 .23287 .054 
External_Pressure 11 1.24 .00 1.24 .8300 .09376 .31097 .097 
Financial_Target 11 .03 .00 .02 .0036 .00310 .01027 .000 
Nature_Of_Industry 11 14.23 -6.92 7.31 .4509 1.29889 4.30792 18.558 
Ineffective_Monitoring 11 .76 .38 1.14 .6609 .05769 .19134 .037 
Change_In_Auditor 11 1.00 .00 1.00 .1818 .12197 .40452 .164 
Capability 11 1.00 .00 1.00 .8182 .12197 .40452 .164 
Financial_Statement_Fraud 11 11.39 -.22 11.17 1.0036 1.01712 3.37341 11.380 
Valid N (listwise) 11        
 
Variable financial stability has a minimum value of -0.5, while the overall average of 0.2045 with a standard 
deviation of 0.23287. Variable external pressure has a value of 0.00, while the minimum overall average of 0.8300 
with a standard deviation of 0.31097. The target financial variables have a minimum value of 0.00 while the 
overall average of 0.0036 with a standard deviation of 0.1027. The variable nature of the industry has a minimum 
value of -6.92 while the overall average of 0.4509 with a standard deviation of 4.30792. Variable ineffective 
monitoring has a minimum value of 0.38, while the overall average of 0.6609 with a standard deviation of 0.19134. 
Variable change in auditor has a minimum value of 0.00, while the overall average standard deviation of 0.18182 
to 0.40452. Variable capability has a minimum value 0.00, while the overall average of 0.8182 with a standard 
deviation of 0.40452. Variable Financial Statement Fraud with earnings management proxies have a minimum 
value of -0.22, while the overall average of 1.0036 with a standard deviation of 3.37341. 
 
5.3  Hypothesis Test 
 
a.  Test Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
 
Based on the results of data processing output SPSS 18, figures adjusted R square or coefficient is -0.87. This 
means that 8.7%, while 91.4% of the variation or change in financial statement fraud was obtained from Pressure, 
Opportunity, Rationalization and Capability Standard Error of Estimate (SEE) equal to 4.16050. 
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Table 2. Test Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Summary Model b 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
 
1 .296a .087 -.521 4.16050 .087 .144 4 6 .959 1.214 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Capability, Change_In_Auditor, Opportunity, Pressure  
b. Dependent Variable: Financial_Statement_Fraud 
 
b.  Simultaneous Significance Test (Test Statistic F) 
 
Based on the ANOVA test (F test) in Table 3, the calculated F value is obtained at 0.144 with 0.959 significance 
level < 0.05 then the hypothesis null hypothesis is accepted. The value of its F 0.144 with` significant value 0.959 
> 0.005, the null hypothesis is accepted. It can be concluded 7 (seven) independent variables simultaneously and 
significant effect on the financial statement fraud. 
 
Table 3. Simultaneous Significance test (Test Statistic F) 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.940 4 2.485 0.144 0.959a 
Residual 103.859 6 17.310   
Total 113.799 10    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Capability, Change_In_Auditor, Opportunity, Pressure 
b. Dependent Variable: Financial_Statement_Fraud   
 
c.  Individual Parameter Significance Test (Test Statistic t) 
 
Table 4. Significance Test (Test Statistic t) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Correlations Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order 
Parti
al 
Part Toleran
ce 
VIF 
.951 3.531  .269 .797 -7.690 9.591      
-2.008 4.452 -.261 -.451 .668 -12.902 8.886 -.077 -.181 -.176 .453 2.208 
-.059 .403 -.073 -.147 .888 -1.045 .926 .102 -.060 -.057 .609 1.642 
-1.353 3.381 -.162 -.400 .703 -9.625 6.919 -.152 -.161 -.156 .926 1.080 
2.994 5.116 .359 .585 .580 -9.525 15.513 .139 .232 .228 .404 2.475 
a. Dependent Variable: Financial_Statement_Fraud 
 
Based on the results of individual parameter significance test (statistical test t) above are: 
1.  The value of the constant is positive 0.951 when variables that showed financial stability, external pressure, 
financial targets, nature of industry, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor and capability no change or 
equal to 0 it will increase the financial statement fraud. 
2.  Variable variable financial stability, external pressure, the pressure of financial targets has marked negative 
regression coefficient of -2.008, this means that if the value of pressure increase of 1 unit assuming other 
variables are fixed it will lower the financial statement fraud amounting to 2.008. 
3.  Variable variable nature of the industry and ineffective monitoring of the opportunity to have a regression 
coefficient is negative at -509, it means that when the opportunity value increased by 1 unit, assuming other 
variables are fixed it will lower the financial statement fraud of 0.59. 
4.  Variable variables change in auditor on the rationalization has a marked negative regression coefficient of -
1.353, this means that if the value increased by 1 unit rationalization assuming other variables are fixed it will 
lower the financial statement fraud amounting to 2.008. 
5.  Variable capability variables have marked negative regression coefficient of 2.994, this means that if the value 
increased by 1-unit capability assuming other variables are fixed it will lower the financial statement fraud 
amounted to 2,994. 
 
d.  Regression Analysis 
 
Regression equations were formed in this research are: 
 
Y = 0951 - 2.008X1 - 0.59X2 - 1.353X3 - 2.994X4 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis 
Variable Regression coefficients Standard Error Value Statistics t Probability Value 
Pressure -2.008 4.452 -0.451 0.797 
Opportunity -0.059 0.403 -0.147 0.668 
Rationalization -1.353 3.381 -0.400 0.703 
Capability 2.994 5.116 0.585 0.580 
 
1.  The first hypothesis shows t value of -0.451 with a regression coefficient of -2.008 and probability value of 
0.797 can be concluded that the variable pressure by proxy financial stability, external pressure and financial 
targets can be a negative influence on the Financial Statement Fraud. 
2.  The second hypothesis show t value of -0.147 with a regression coefficient of -0.059 and probability value of 
0.668 can be concluded that the variable nature of the industry Opportunity and ineffective monitoring can be 
a negative influence on the Financial Statement Fraud. 
3.  The third hypothesis indicates that the t value of -0.400 with a regression coefficient of -1.353 and Probability 
value of 0,703 can conclude that the rationalization variables change in the auditor can give a negative effect 
on the Financial Statement Fraud. 
4.  The fourth hypothesis indicates that the t value of 0.585 with a regression coefficient of 2.994 and a probability 
value of 0.580 to the variable Capability with proxy turn of directors gave a positive influence on the Financial 
Statement Fraud. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
 
This study examined the empirical evidence to detect financial statement fraud with fraud perspective diamond. 
This study refers to the banking company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The results of this study indicate 
that the variable pressure is proxied by financial stability, external pressure, and financial targets; Opportunity is 
proxied by ineffective monitoring and nature of the industry; Rationalization is proxied by the turn of the auditor 
and Capability proxied by the change of directors. But in this study proves that the Variable Pressure with proxies 
financial stability, external pressure and financial targets; Opportunity variable nature of the industry and 
ineffective monitoring and rationalization variables change in the auditor does not affect the financial statement 
fraud while variable Capability with proxy turn of directors gave a positive and significant effect on the Financial 
Statement Fraud. 
 
Based on the analysis and discussion on this research (empirical studies on banking companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange Year 2012 to 2014), then the suggestion that researchers can provide as follows: 
1.  For the Company, financial statement fraud detection can be done by placing the employee in a company 
which has the ability in fraud detecting, internal control weaknesses and possess a strong ego and self-
confidence detecting and be able to control job stress (Wolf & Hermanson, 2014 in Nursani & Irianto, 2014). 
2.  For investors, changes in board of directors can not accurately indicate cheating for it is expected to investors 
not to be too quick in doing the change of directors at the company. 
3.  For further research, the authors suggest may conduct research using other measurement methods to detect 
financial statement fraud, and may use a combination of methods with qualitative and quantitative methods 
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